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[L. A. Nos. 23024, 23025. In Bank. Dee. 3, 1954.J 
ARCHIE B. SHOHE, Respondent, v. ALBERTA MAE 
SHORE, Appellant. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1 ] Maniage-Annulment - Hearing and Determlnation.-When 
property rights of parties are properly put in issue by plead· 
ings in annulment action, court may determine them. 
[2] rd. - Incidents of Void and Voidable Marriages - Property 
Rights.-If purported marriage was not entered into in good 
faith, court may not properly award property of parties as if 
marriage had been valid and property community in character. 
[3] Id.-Annulment--Decree.-Decision of court in annulment 
action awarding annulment to wife on ground that husband 
had another spouse living at time of his purported marriage to 
her and deciding that, because parties were itt pari delicto, 
it lacks jurisdiction to make any award of property alleged 
to be community in character, is tantamount to dismissal of 
respective claims of parties with respect to their property 
interests. 
[4] Judgments-Res Judlcat&-Dismissal.-When decision on juris-
dictional question is based on determination of merits of an 
issue before court, it constitutes a binding determination of 
that issue. 
[5J Marriage-Incidents of Void and Voidable Marriages-Prop-
erty Rights.-Fact that man and woman do not in good faith 
believe they are married does not preclude court from pro-
tecting their respective interests in jointly acquired property. 
[6] Id. - Annulment - Decree - Conclusivenesa.-Regardless of 
whether or not husband in annulment action sought to establish 
his interest in jointly acquired property on theory of claim to 
one-half interest therein without reference to purported 
marital relationship, his subsequent action to establish his 
interest on that theory is barred by adjudication in annulment 
action awarding annulment to wife and refusing to make any 
disposition of property OD ground that parties were in pari 
[2J Rights and remedies in respect of property accumulated 
by man and woman living together in illicit relations or under 
void marriage, note, 31 A.L.R.2d 1255. See also Cal.Jur., Mar-
riage, § 21; Am.Jur., Marriage, § 50 et seq. 
[4J See Cal.Jur., Judgments, § 185; Am.Jur., Judgments, § 208. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,3,6] Marriage, § 44; (2,5J Marriage, 
§22; [4] Judf,rments, §353(1); [7] Judgments, §360; [8] Judg-
ments, §§ 395, 396. 
) 
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dr/ir/o 111 n".;pl·l~t. to t.hf'ir purport,!d IIl11rringt', sinel' dcrisilJlI 
in Kur.h IIction \\'I'llt to merits of pnrported hn!lhnnd's claim to 
right to intprC'st in propC'rty. 
[7] Judgments-Res Judicata-Matters Concluded.-A judgment 
in action between same parties on identical cause of ot'tion 
is res judicata and a bar to second suit thereon, not only as 
to issues actually determined therein hut also as to issue!l 
necessarily involved. 
[8] Id.-Res Judicata - Matters Concluded.-Though causes of 
action be different, prior detC'rmination of issue is eonclusive 
in subsequent suit between same parties as to that issue and 
every matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat 
its determination. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Kern 
County. William L. Bradshaw. Judge. Reversed. 
Actions to establish title to undivided oue-half interest in 
real and personal property in possession of defendant, and 
for partition of personal property. Judgments for plaintiff 
reversed. 
Siemon & Siemon and Alfred Siemon for Appellant. 
Kendall & Howell and William A. Howell for Respondent. 
'l'RA YNOR, J .-Archie B. Shore brought these actions to 
establish his title to an undivided one-half interest in certain 
real and personal property in the possession of defendant 
Alberta Mae Shore and to secure a partition of the personal 
property. The actions were consvlidated for trial. in her 
answers, Alberta pleaded that Archie's actions were barred 
by a decree of annulment between the parties and that Archie 
had given her his one-half interest in the property while 
they were living together as husband and wife. Title to all 
of the property had originally been taken by the parties as 
joint tenants. The trial court found that the annulment 
decree was not a bar to these actions and that Archie had 
not made a gift of his interest in the property to Alberta. 
It further found that Archie had deeded his interest in 
the real property to defendant to protect his interest from 
unfounded claims against him by third parties and that 
Alberta held Archie's interest on an oral trust for him. 
Since a confidential relationship had existed between the 
parties and since the claims against Archie wel'e unfounded, 
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jud~IJH:\lIt that each party was the owner of an undh'idcd 
ol\r-half interest in the real propcrty. In the action for 
partition of the personal property it entered judgment that 
('8t'h of the partiE's was the owner of an undivided one-half 
inten'st and ordered a partition. Alberta has appealed from 
both judgments. 
Relying on the following facts, Alberta contends that the 
trial court erred in holding that the decree in the annul-
ment action was not a bar to these actions. At the time of 
the annulment action in 1951, title to the real property 
stood in her name and she was in possession of both the 
real and personal property. In her complaint for divorce 
or annulment she alleged that the property involved in this 
action was her separate property and prayed that the court 
so determine. In his answer and cross-complaint for annul. 
ment, Archie alleged that the property was the community 
or jointly acquired property of the parties and prayed that 
it be divided equally between them. The trial court awarded 
an annulment to Alberta on the ground that Archie had 
another spouse living at the time of his purported marriage 
to Alberta. It also found that the parties were in pari 
delicto, and "that the Court, therefore. makes no findings 
concerning the character of the property set out in the first 
cause of action of [Alberta's] complaint." As a conclusion 
of law it stated ., That the Court, finding both parties at 
fault in the purported marriage, declines for lack of juris-
diction to make any award of property alleged to be com· 
munity in character." 
Alberta contends that the foregoing finding and conclu-
sion constitute a binding adjudication that at the time of 
the annulment neither party was entitled to relief against 
the other with respect to the property here in question. 
Archie contends, on the other hand, that a denial of relief 
for lack of jurisdiction does not constitute a judgment on 
the merits and that in any event no adjudication with re-
spect to the property was carried into the formal decree 
of annulment. 
[1] When the property rights of the parties are properly 
put ill issue by the pleadings in an annulment action. the 
court llIay determine them. (Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 
354. :1&7 I ~!l:; P. !l391 ; .QclUlp.;der v . • "'Icltneider, 183 Cal. 335, 
342 lHJl P. 533, 11 A.hR. 13861; s(!e 8allfluinetli v. San-
fluilll'ffi, !) C'a1.2rl 95, 99 [69 P.2d 845, 111 A.L.R. 342].} 
[2] If the purported marriage was not entered into in 
-) 
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good faith, however, the court may not properly award the 
property of the parties as if the marriage had been valict 
and the property community in character. (Vallera v. Val. 
lera, 21 Cal.2d 681, 684-685 [134 P.2d 761) ; Baskett v. Crook. 
86 Cal.App.2d 355, 362 [195 P.2d 39] ; Taylor v. Taylor, 66 
Cal.App.2d 390, 399 [152 P.2d 480}.) [3] When the de-
cision of the court in the annulment action is viewed in 
the light of these rules, it is elear that it constituted more 
than a decision on the issue of jurisdiction. It was also a 
determination on the merits of Archie's claim that the prop-
erty should be divided equally as the community or jointly 
acquired property of the parties. The court did not merely 
decide that it lacked jurisdiction to award the property, it 
decided that because the parties were in pari delicto neither 
of them was entitled to legal assistance with respect to their 
property interests. Accordingly, when the decree of annul-
ment is interpreted in the light of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law (see City of Vernon v. Superior Court, 
38 Ca1.2d 509, 514 [241 P.2d 243]; Gelfand v. O'Haver, 
33 Ca1.2d 218, 222 [200 P.2d 790)} , it is clear that it was 
tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the 
parties with respect to their property interests. The situa-
tion is thus clo!lely analogous to that in Olwell v. Hopkins, 
28 Cal.2d 147' [168 P.2d 972], where it was held that a 
judgment of dismissal was res judicata when it appeared 
that the dismissal was based upon a determination that the 
contract sued upon was void. The court recognized that 
"Ordinarily a judgment of dismissal is not a judgment on 
the merits and therefore does not operate as a bar to another 
action on the same cause of action. This court has recog-
nized, however, that a dismissal may follow an actual deter-
mination on the merits [citations] as have courts in other 
jurisdictions .••. At the hearing upon their motion to dis-
miss the present action, defendants introduced in evidence 
the record of the first action. It is clear from that record 
that the one issue passed upon by the trial court in dismissing 
the first action wa.~ that raised by defendants' contention 
that plaintiff's cause of action was based upon a contract 
that was void. The defense thus interposed went to the 
merits of plaintiffs' cause of action. . . . [Defendants] raised 
an issue as to plaintiffs' right to recover under any eir-
cumstanc('!; IIpon their al\fOged ('uuse of action and upon 
that issue the COUl't r(,lld('\'t'cl jmlgm('nt against plaintiffs." 
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I'm;.- i~ {·qually ;ll'l'li"al>ll' h,·"C', IUlil a"{'ol'/lillgly w,, I~ondud(' 
that although a jlldg1l1l'nt refusing to Il~tl'rmille an issue 
on the ground of 1111'1. of jurisdil'tion is not ordinarily res 
judicata (STaker v. JfcConnick·Saeltzer Co., 179 Cal. 387, 
389 [177 P. 155]; see also Stark v, Coker, 20 CaUd 839, 
843·);;44 [129 P.2d 390]), when the decision on the jurisdic· 
tional question is based upon a determination of the merits 
of an issue before the court, it constitutes a binding deter-
mination of that issue, 
In the present actions Archie is not seeking to establish 
an interest in the property growing out of tce purported 
marital relationship. He relies on evidence with respect 
to the acquisition of the property and the parties' dealings 
therewith that the trial court fOlmd to be sufficient to estab-
lish his claim to a one-half interest without reference to 
that relationship. [5] As was pointed out in Vallera v. 
Vall era, supra, 21 Cal.2d 681, 685, the fact that a man and 
woman do not in good faith believe they are married does 
not preelude the court from protecting their respective in-
terests in jointly acquired property. Accordingly if Archie 
advanced the theory of recovery he now relies upon in the 
annulment action, the court erred in holding that the fact 
the parties were in pari delicto prevented relief. [6] AI. 
though it does not appear that Archie sought to establish ! 
his interest in the property in the annulment action on the I 
theory now advanced, whether he did or not, these actions 
are barred by that adjudication. He now seeks to establish 
the same, right in the property that he sought to establish 
in the annulment action, and the decision in that action 
went to the merits of his claim. If the court in the 
annulment action erroneously applied the doctrine of pan 
deUcto to deny relief on the theory now advanced, Archie's 
remedy was by appeal. On the other hand, if Archie failed 
to present the present theory of recovery in the former 
action, it is too late for him to do so now. The situation 
is legally indistinguishable from that in Krier v. Krier, 28 
Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d 681], where a wife sought in succes-
sive actions to ectablish an interest in the same property on 
di1ierent legal theories. "In the prior separate maintenance 
action Mrs. Krier sought and procured an adjudication with 
respect to her interest in the property. She here seeks a 
second adjl111ic·ation relative to her interest in the same 
property. [7] It is settled, however, that a jUdgment in 
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f'lll1SP. of Ilction is r('11 judicata. and a hllr to a secon!! suit 
1I11'1'flOII not onlv IU; to j~I';IWI-; :1l'tlll1l1y .\"t!'1"lllitll'd tlu'rl'jll 
but al~o a.c; to' iSSlll'!; 1H'('('s~:t rily j;1VolvNl. I Citat inns. J 
[8] And even though tht' eanse of action be different. thE' 
prior determination of an issue is conclusive in a subsl"quent 
suit between the same parties as to that issue and ('wry 
matter which might have been urged to sustain or defeat its 
determination. [Citations. J 
"Having claimed th(' property in the prior action solely 
as community property and having procured a d('cree 
therein based on its character as such, Mrs. Krier is pre· 
eluded from seeking in this later action another award 
thereof based on an entirely different interest (holDestead 
or otherwise) existing, but unclaimed, at th(' time of th(' 
earlier adjudication. Under the circumstances she was re-
quired to advance her entire interest, whether community 
or homestead, or both, in order to permit the court to mak(' 
an effective and complete acijudication of the respectiv(' 
interests of the parties. [Citation.] Not having done so, 
she cannot relitigate the matter, whether it be held that the 
two suits involved the same cause of action insofar as they 
concerned her interest in the property, or ~erely involved 
a common issue as to her interest in the property." (28 
Ca1.2d at 843-844,) 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. 
I do not agree that the finding of the trial court in the 
annulment action bronght by Alberta to the effect that "the 
Court, therefore, makes no findings concerning the character 
of the property set out in the first cause of action of [Al-
berta's] complaint" and the conclusion of law that "the 
Court, finding both parties at fault in the purported mar-
riage, declines for lack of jurisdiction to make any award 
of property alleged to be community in character," con· 
stituted a binding determination of the property issue so as 
to constitute a bar to the present actions. It was, in my 
opinion, a specific declaration that the issue had not been 
adjudicated. 
"There can be no doubt that the dismissal of an action 
or denial of relief for want of jurisdiction is not a judgment 
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seqllcntly prosecuting his action in any Conrt anthoriz('d 
to cntertain and detE'rmine it. No question otlll'r than the' 
jurisdit:tional one is concluded by such a judgment, silJ('e 
after the Court has determined its lack of jurisdiction, filly 
further finding or judgment as to the matters alleged is wQoll~' 
ineffective. . . . Refusal to pass on a particular matter for 
lack of jurisdiction is not an adjudication of it." (Freeman 
on Judgments. 5th ed., vol. 2, p. 1546. § 733. (In Slaki·r ". 
McOormick-Saeltzer 00., 179 Cal. 387. 389 fI77 P. 155]. this 
court said: "Looking merely to the judgment in the fore-
closure suit, it is very plain that the court did not therein 
undertake to pass upon the merits of the contro.ersy between 
Slaker and the McCormick-Saeltzer Compan~'. What it did 
?vas to decline to determine that controversy, for the reason 
that it was without jurisdiction, in that action, so to do. 
Whether the holdina that it had no jurisdiction was sound 
or erroneous is not a question for consideration here. Tit/! 
essential point is that there was no adjudication of t11e 
merits . ... " (Emphasis added . .) It is elemental that 8 
judgment which has not been rendered on the merits is not 
res judicata (Oampanella v. Oampanella, 204 Cal. 515 [269 
P. 433); Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. 00., 14 
Ca1.2d 47, 52 [92 P.2d 804] ; Gonsalves v. Bank of America. i 
16 Ca1.2d 169, 173 [105 P.2d 118]: Everts v. Blaschko, 17 
Cal.App.2d 188 [61 P.2d 776] ; Matteson v. Klump, 100 Cal. 
App. 64 [279 P. 669] ; Helvey v.Oastles, 73 Cal.App.2d 60';' 
[167 P.2d 4921; .Jacobs v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Soc .. 
4 Cal.App.2d 1 [40 P.2d 899]; Miller v. Ambassador Par!. 
Syndicate, 121 Cal.App. 92 [9 P.2d 267] ; Taylor v. Darlil1U. 
22 Cal.App. 101 [133 P. 503]; Security T. & S. Bank v. 
Southern Pac. 00., 214 Cal. 81 [3 P.2d 1015] ; Scheeline " 
Moshier, 172 Cal. 565 r158 P. 222]). 
What the majority is saying is, in effect, this: When tlw 
trial court determined it had no jurisdiction to decide the 
question of property, it was really a determination on th(' 
merits that neither party was entitled to relief and therefor!' 
"tantamount to a dismissal of the respective claims of the 
parties with respect to their property interests." The trial 
court spe!'ifically made no finding as to the character of the 
property. A!'. in t.he SlakeI' case, it declined to determin!' 
t.he controversy for the reason that it felt it wa.~ without 
jurisdiction. "Whether the hoMing that it had no jurisdic-
tion was SOUIlIl or crroneous is not a question for consideration 
here. The essential point is that there was no adjudieation 
) 
) 
SHORE V. SUORI!: 
011 the merits. "In order to reach the conclusion reached 
by the majority, too many "ifs" are involved. First it i~ 
8aid "if Archie advanced the theory of recovery" now relif'd 
on, the court erred in holding that the doctrine of pari delicto 
prevented relief. Then that "if" is discarded with the 
statement that "it does not appear that Archie" did seek to 
establish his interest on the theory now advanced. Secondly. 
it is said "if the court in the annulment action erroneously 
applied the doctrine of pari delicto to deny relief on the 
theory now advanced, Archie's remedy was by appeal." 
Then it is said: "On the other hand, if Archie failed to 
present the present theory of recovery in the former action, 
it is too late for him to do so now." The rule set forth in 
Krier v. Krier, 28 Cal.2d 841 [172 P.2d 681], is not applicable 
here. When a court specifically declines to pass upon an issue, 
the rule as to issues involved directly, or necessarily involved 
by implication, does not apply. 
Before the trial court could reach any conclusion with re-
spect to the respective property interests involved, it had 
first to determine the character of the property. This it did 
not do. That no determination was in fact made is borne 
out by the language used in the conclusion of law wherein 
comment is made concerning the "alleged" commnnity cbar-
acter of the property. As we said in Stark v. Coker, 20 Ca1.2d 
839, 840, 843 [129 P.2d 390J. "While it is true that as a 
general rule a judgment is a bar as res judicata not only as 
to a subsequent action on the same matter actually determined, 
but also as to all issues that might have been litigated as 
incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter 
of the litigation and every matter coming within its legitimate 
purview (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1908, 1911; 15 Cal.Jur. 142 
et seq.), it is also true that that only is adjudged in a former 
judgment which appears upon its face to have been adjudged 
or which was actually and necessarily included therein or 
necessary thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1911.) And when it 
affirmatively appears that an issue was fIOt determined by 
the judgment, it obviously is not res judicata upon that issue. 
A judgment is not an adjudication as to matters which thl! 
court e:epressly refrains from determining. (Watson v. Poore, 
18 Ca1.2d 302 [115 P.2d 4781; 15 Ca1.Jnr. 150.)" (Emphasis 
added.) 
If we were not faced with the specific finding that no df" 
termination was made as to the character of the property. 
the position taken in the majority opinion might be entitled 
) 
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to more cre"ibjlit.~·. 'I'he rule I hfLV~ just set forth ilS sfatf'lI 
in the SIak.,!" ,'ase is I·",~ognized hy the majority. hilI 11I'l'pr 
theless, the conclusion is reached that since the deeisioll of 1 hl' 
trial court on the jurisdictiollal question was based upon a 
determination of the merits" of an issue before the court. it 
constitutes a binding determination of that issue." It seem!; 
to me to be ineseapable that before the trial court could mnk!' 
a binding determination of the property issue based on th!' 
merits, it must, first, determine whether it had jurisdiction 
to make such determination, but it expressly held that it baei 
no jurisdiction to determine such issue and refused to de-
termine it. 
It is my view that the majority opinion is clearly in con-
flict with the rule set forth in Freeman on Judgments (supra) 
and Slaker v. McOormick-Saeltzer 00., supra, as well as 
Stark v. Ooker, supra. The rule announced in the majority 
opinion extends the doctrine of res judicata beyond its in-
tended scope in that a majority of this court there concludes, 
in the face of a clear statement by the trial court to the 
contrary, that an issue was finally determined so as to con-
stitute a bar to a second action. The logical result of the 
conclusion reached by the majority is to deprive the plaintiff 
in such an action of his day in court. 
I would affirm the judgments. 
Shenk, J.t and Schauer, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied De-
cember 29, 1954. Sh!'nk .• 1., Carter .• T., ann Schauer, J., were 
of the opinion that the petition should be granted. 
